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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
230 South 500 East No. 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re State v. C. Dean Larsen, Case No. 930286 
Dear Judges: 
I am writing pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure to advise the Court of the 
opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Larsen, 865 
P.2d 1335 (Utah 1993) (copy enclosed). Pages 1357 through 
13 6 0 of this case are relevant to an argument made on page 
42 of defendant's brief on appeal. 
Oral argument in this case 
tomorrow, April 19, 1994, at 9:00 a.m. 
this letter was not more timely. 
is scheduled for 
I apologize that 
Yours very truly, 
j m 
[IC VOROS, J R . 
distant Attorney General 
enclosure 
copy: Larry R. Keller, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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STATE v. LARSEN 
Cite at 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) 
We have observed that under the more 
stringent requirements of service of process 
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4, it is 
not required that a plaintiff exhaust all possi-
bilities as a means of finding and serving a 
defendant, only that the plaintiff exercise 
reasonable diligence in good faith.10 The Bar 
has met this requirement 
Utah 1355 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
C. Dean LARSEN, Defendant 
and Petitioner. 
[41 We have also previously determined 
that in disbarment proceedings, adherence to 
minimum due process requirements includes 
notice of a hearing.11 On December 6, 1991, 
a notice of hearing set for March 2,1992, was 
sent by certified mail to Schwenke's address 
as shown on the official roster of attorneys of 
the Bar and to the Las Vegas address. 
Schwenke appeared at the sanctions hearing 
and admitted that he received notice of the 
hearing on February 6> 1992; at the Las 
Vegas residence. Between the time 
Schwenke received the notice of hearing and 
the date of the hearing, he neither contacted 
the Bar nor filed an answer to the formal 
complaint At the sanctions hearing, 
Schwenke cross-examined witnesses called 
by the Bar and testified in his defense as to 
the charges set forth in the formal complaint 
We accordingly conclude that Schwenke 
was properly served with the summons and 
formal complaint on December 4, 1990, and 
that all subsequent documents were, also 
properly served, thereby affording adequate 
notice and opportunity to respond to the 
charges leveled against him. Although 
Schwenke was in fact in default, he was 
nevertheless afforded a full-scale hearing on 
the merits of the allegations against him. 
We have duly considered Schwenke's other 
arguments and find them to be without mer-
i t 
[5] The order of disbarment and the pay-
ment of restitution is affirmed. 
HOWE, A.C.J., and STEWART, 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
1 0 IKCY NUMBER SYSTEM 3> 
No. 920114. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 17, 1993. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Leonard 
H. Russon, J., of 18 counts of criminal securi-
ties fraud. Defendant appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, 828 P.2d 487, affirmed. On de-
fendant's petition for writ of certiorari, the 
Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: 
(1) requirement that defendant act willfully 
did not require proof of intent to deceive, 
manipulate or defraud; (2) trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting security ex-
pert's testimony; (3) security expert's use of 
word "material" was not improper instruction 
to jury on law, and (4) if expert's testimony 
couched in terms of materiality was error, 
error was harmless. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <s»1134(3) 
Interpretation of statute is question of 
law and is reviewed for correctness. 
2. Statutes $»188 
When faced with question of statutory 
construction, Supreme Court first examines 
plain language of statute. 
3. Securities Regulation $s>323 
Statute requiring that individual act 
"willfully" to be criminally liable for securi-
ties fraud does not require "scienter," the 
10. Downey State Bank v Major-Blakeney Corpt 
545 P2d 507, 509 (Utah 1976). 
11. Schwenke, 849 ?2d at 576 
1356 Utah 865 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud. 
U.CA1953, 61-1-1(2), 61-1-21. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
4. Criminal Law G»20 
To act "willfully" for purposes of crimi-
nal responsibility means to act deliberately 
and purposefully, as distinguished from 
merely accidently or inadvertently, willful, 
when applied to intent with which act is done 
or omitted, implies willingness to commit act, 
but does not require intent to violate law or 
to injure another or acquire any advantage. 
U.OA.1953, 76-2-103. 
5. Criminal Law <S»469.2, 1153(1) 
Trial court has wide discretion in deter-
mining admissibility of expert testimony, and 
such decisions are reviewed under abuse of 
discretion: standard. 
6. Criminal Law ®=>1147 , 
Under abuse of discretion standard, Sur« 
preme Court will not reverse trial court un-
less decision exceeds limits of reasonability. 
7. Criminal Law ^»469.1 
Under rule governing admissibility and 
limits of expert testimony, question that 
must be posed prior to admission of any 
expert evidence is whether on balance evi-
dence will be helpful to finder of fact Rules 
of Evid., Rule 702. 
8. Criminal Law <S»471 
In determining helpfulness of expert tes-
timony, trial court must first decide whether 
subject is within knowledge or experience of 
average individual; it is not necessary that 
subject of testimony be so,erudite or arcane 
that jurors could not possibly understand it 
without aid of expert testimony, nor is it 
required that subject be beyond comprehen-
sion of each and every juror. Rules of Evid., 
Rule 702. 
9. Criminal Law <8»476.3 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that expert testimony in securi-
ties fraud prosecution would be helpful to 
jury, where expert expressed opinion that 
some of material that defendant had omitted 
from securities documents could have been 
important or significant to investor, techni-
cal nature of securities was not within knowl-
edge of average layman or subject within 
common experience. Rules of Evid., Rule 
702; U.CJU953, 61-1-1(2), 61-1-21. 
10. Criminal Law e»469.3 
Securities expert's use of word "materi-
al" during testimony was not improper in-
struction to jury on law in securities fraud 
prosecution; although statute under wThich 
defendant was prosecuted required finding 
that information not disclosed was "materi-
al," testimony when read in context seemed 
to use word "material" as synonym for "im-
portant"' U.C.A.1953, 61-1-1(2), 61-1-21; 
Rules of Evid., Rule 702. 
11. Criminal Law <S»470(1) 
Insofar as expert's testimony expressed 
opinion as to ultimate issue, it was not objec-
tionable solely on that basis. Rules of Evid., 
Rule 704. 
12. Criminal Law <3»470(1) 
Expert testimony is not inadmissible 
simply because it expresses opinion xm ulti-
mate issue. Rules of Evid., Rule 704. 
13. Criminal Law <S»469 
Integral element of rule governing ad-
mission of expert testimony is balancing of 
probativeness of evidence against its poten-
tial for unfair prejudice. Rules of Evid.^  
Rule 702. 
14. Criminal Law <S»1169.5(2) 
Even if admission of securities expert's 
testimony couched in terms of materiality 
was error, error was harmless; trial court 
correctly admonished jury as to relative roles 
of expert testimony and opinion evidence and 
instructed jury to accord no unusual defer-
ence to expert's opinions, and gave careful 
instructions regarding legal definition and 
requirements of term "material" as used in 
STATE •. 
Cite as 865 P.2d 
statute. U.C.A.1953, 61-1-1(2), 61-1-21; 
Rules of Evid., Rule 704. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., David B. 
Thompson, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and respondent 
Larry R. Keller, John T. Nielsen, David L. 
Arlington, Joel G. Momberger, Jon E. Wad-
doups, Melyssa D. Davidson, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and petitioner. 
ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
C. Dean Larsen petitioned for a writ of 
certiorari, seeking review of a Utah Court of 
Appeals decision upholding the district 
court's rulings on two issues relating to his 
conviction on eighteen counts of criminal se-' 
curities fraud. Larsen contends that the tri-
al court erred in refusing to instruct the jury 
that the intent to defraud, deceive, or manip-
ulate is an element of a criminal violation of 
sections 1(2) and 21 of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act See Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-
1-1(2), -21. Larsen also complains that the 
trial court erroneously allowed a State expert 
to testify as to the "materiality" of informa-
tion that Larsen allegedly had failed to dis-
close to investors. We affirm his convictions. 
The facts of this case are detailed in the 
court of appeals' opinion in State v. Larsen, 
828 P.2d 487,488-90 (Utah CtApp.1992). To 
summarize, Larsen was charged with, and 
convicted of, eighteen counts of securities 
fraud under sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 
of the Code. These convictions arose out of 
his actions while president of a real estate'' 
development company in which others had 
invested Larsen's criminal acts included his 
failure to inform investors of material infor-
mation related to the company, misrepresen-
tations of material facts regarding the eom-
1. In this case, this court is concerned only with 
the proper construction of a portion of section 
61-1-1, specifically subsection 1(2) We there-
fore do not address the question of whether sub-
LARSEN Utah 1357 
1353 (Utah 1993) 
pany*s financial status, and related acts of 
dishonesty. Larsen appealed to the court of 
appeals, which affirmed his convictions. 828 
P.2d at 496. We granted certiorari to con-
sider his claims of legal error. 
Larsen first asserts that the trial court 
erroneously instructed the jury as to the 
applicable law. He alleges that the trial 
court improperly refused to give portions of 
his proposed instructions concerning the ele-
ments of and defenses to criminal securities 
fraud. The omitted portions, in substance, 
would have instructed the jury that to be 
guilty of a. criminal violation of section 61-1-
1(2), Larsen must have acted with the specif-
ic intent to defraud and that a representation 
made "in good faith constitutes a complete 
defense to a charge of securities fraud." 
[1] The propriety of the instructions giv-
en hinges on the correct interpretation of 
sections 61-1-1(2) and -21.* In particular, 
does a criminal violation of these sections 
require proof of an intent to defraud, deceive, 
or manipulate? The correct interpretation of 
a statute is a question of law and is reviewed 
for correctness. State v. James, 819 P.2d 
781, 796 (Utah 1991); Ward n Richfield City, 
798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). 
[2,3] When faced with a question of stat-
utory construction, this court first examines 
the plain language of the statute. Schurtz v. 
BMW ofN. Am, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 
(Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 
497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam). Section 
61-1-1(2) states in relevant part: 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection 
with the offer, sale, or purchase of any 
security,, directly or indirectly to: 
(2) make any untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact o r to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circum-
sections 1(1) and 1(3) require scienter Cf. Aar-
on v Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 446 U S. 680, 
695-702, 100 S.Ct 1945, 1954-1959, 64 L.Ed.2d 
611 (1980). 
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stances under .which they are made, not-
misleading. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) *, This section's, 
standards govern both civil and criminal lia-
bility. To ascertain the elements of a crimi-
nal violation, however, this section must be 
read in conjunction with section 61-1-21, 
which specifies the requisite mental state and, 
penalties for a criminal violation. Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-21. Section 61-1-21 provides in 
pertinent part:-
Any person who willfully violates any pro-
vision of this chapter [including section 61-
1-1(2)] . \ . or who willfully violates any 
rule or order under this chapter . . . shall 
upon conviction be fined not more than* 
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than three1 
years, or both. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (emphasis add-
ed). The plain language of section 61-1-21 
requires that to be liable for a criminal viola-, 
tion of section 61-1-1(2), the defendant must 
have acted "willfully" in misstating or omit-
ting material facts. Id. Larsen asks thi^ 
court to interpret "willfully" as requiring 
"scienter," the intent to deceive, manipulate,-
or defraud, as defined by the United States-
Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst* v. Hock* 
folder, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47 
L.Ed.2d 668 (1976), a.rule 10b-5 case. 
[4] In determining whether we can, or 
should, give "willfully" such a construction, 
we first look to £he statutory definition of 
"willful." The legislature has indicated that 
a person acts willfully when it is his oi* her' 
2. In 1963, the Utah legislature substantially 
adopted the Uniform Securities Act, which had 
been developed by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 to -30; Uniform Se-
curities Act, reprinted in Blue Sky Laws 1993 
289-374 (1993). Sie generally Wallace R. Ben-
nett, Securities Regulation in Utah: A Recap of 
History and the New Uniform Act, 8 Utah L.Rev. 
216, 227-28 (1963). The Uniform Act contains 
an anti-fraud provision, section 101, modeled 
after, and with language taken from, section 
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and rule 10b-
5, which was promulgated pursuant to section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
See Uniform Securities Act § 101, cmt. .01; Blue 
Sky Laws, at 295. The Utah legislature incorpo-
rated section 101 into the Utah Code as section 
"desire to engage in the conduct that cause[s] 
the result" Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103. 
Nothing in this definition requires scienter.3 
Moreover, a brief survey of the Code con-
firms that the Utah legislature knows how to 
require scienter, if it so desires, by including 
specific language to that effect See, e.g., idL 
§§ 23-20-27, 41-la-1319, 76-^-506.2, 76-10-
706 & +1006V 
Failing to find support in the express 
terms of the Code, Larsen suggests that the 
scienter requirement is an "independent ele-
ment" of the offense. Stated another way, 
although it is not apparent from the language 
of the provision, Larsen contends that we 
should read the scienter requirement into the 
statute. We have rejected similar attempts 
to engraft a judicially created intent require-
ment upon the plain language of a criminal 
statute. E.g., State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 
1314r 1315 (Utah 1983) (holding offense of 
writing bad check does not require intent to 
defraud). Perhaps more on point, other 
states have rejected attempts to import; 
scienter into analogous securities-fraud stat-
utes. See, e.g., People u Johnson* 213 CaL 
App.3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr. 366, 369 (CtApp. 
1989); State v. Temby, 108 Wis.2d 521, 322 
N.W.2d 522, 526 (CtApp.1982); This court 
will not affix new "independent require-
ments" to an otherwise clear and constitu-
tional statute. 
Although the language of the statute effec-
tively disposes of the issue, Larsen asserts 
that this court should look beyond the plain, 
language of the Utah Uniform Securities Act 
61-1-1 without significant modification. Com-
pare Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 with Uniform^ 
Securities Act § 101. 
3 . - To act willfully in this context means to act 
deliberately and purposefully, as distinguished 
from merely accidentally or inadvertently. Cf 
United States v. Hairston, 819 F.2d 971, 974 
(10th Cir.1987). Willful, when applied to the 
intent with which an act is done or omitted,, 
implies a willingness to commit the act, which, 
in this case, is the misstatement or omission of a 
material fact. Willful does not require an intent, 
to violate the law or to injure another or acquire 
any advantage, See generally State v. Tarzuin, 
665 P.2d 582, 585 (Ariz.Ct.App.1983). 
STATE T, 
Cite as 865 P.2d 
to the legislative intent. Section 61-1-27 trf 
the Code provides that Utah's Uniform Secu-
rities Act "may be construed so as to effectu-
ate its general purpose to make uniform th6 
law of those states which enact it ^nd to 
coordinate the interpretation and administra-
tion of this chapter with the related federal 
regulation." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27. 
Larsen asserts that this section was intended 
to bind state judicial interpretations of 
Utah's antifraud provisions to the United 
States Supreme Court's interpretations of 
similar federal securities provisions. Specifi-
cally, Larsen argues that the language simi-
larities between section 61-1-1(2) and rule 
10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission ("SEC"), when viewed in light of the 
intent requirement embodied in section 61-
1-27, require this court to interpret Utah's 
antifraud provision in conformity with .the 
Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst 
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47 
L.Ed.2d 668 (1976). Hochfelder held, inter 
alia, that "scienter," or an intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud, must be proved be-
fore civil liability can be imposed under rule 
10b-5. See id, 425 U.S. at 187, 96 S.Ct at 
1378, 47 L.Ed.2d at 674; Aaron v. Securities 
& Exck < Coram V 446 U.S. 680, 692, 100 
S.Ct. 1945, 1953, 64 L.Ed.2d 611 (1980). 
Larsen's argument is facially legitimate and 
requires response. 
We first examine Hochfeldefs reasoning. 
The issue before the Hochfelder court was 
I -17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
5. 15 I J.S.CIl § 78j(b). 
6 Section 17(a) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer 
or sale of any securities by the use of any 
means or instruments of transportation oi 
communication in interstate commerce or b) 
the use of the mails, directly of indirectly— 
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice 
to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or propertyrby means of 
any untrue statement of a material fact or any 
omission to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would 
.1ARSEN • 'hi! OSif 
1355 (Utah 1993) 
"whether a private cause of action for dam-
ages {would] lie under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 in the absence of any allegation of 'scien-
ter^—intent to-deceive, manipulate, or de-
fraud." ~ Id The SEC promulgated rule 
10b-54 pursuant to powers vested in it by 
section 10(b)5 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 ("1934 Act"). Id at 195, 96 S.Ct at 
1381, The Court ultimately determined that 
scienter is required because the language of 
section 10(b)—the statutory authority upon 
which rule 10b-5 is grounded—implicitly lim-
ited the SEC's power to promulgate an im-
plementing rule to one that required scien-
ter. Id at 213-14, 96 S.Ct at 1390-91; see 
also Aaron, 446 U.S. at 690, 100 S.Ct at 
1952; 2 Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of 
Securities Regulation $ 13.4, at 81 (2d ed 
1990).'-
In contrast to rule 10b-5, Utah's securities 
fraud provision, section 61-1-1(2), does not 
operate against a background of limiting 
statutory authority. "The interpretation we 
give to section 61-1-1(2) of the Utah Code is 
therefore not circumscribed by the disposi-
tive language of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 
In that respect, section 61-1-1(2) of the Code 
atavistically resembles, not rule 10b-5, but 
section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 
which the Aaron Court declined to interpret 
as requiring scienter.. 446 U.S. at 697, 100 
S.Ct at 1956.* Because of this critical differ-
ence, Hochfelder is not particularly helpful in 
interpreting Utah's analogue to rule 10b-5.7 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchas-
er. 
15 U.S.C.f 77q(a). The Supreme Court in Aar-
on stated "that the language of § 17(a) requires 
scienter i finder § 17(a)(1), but not under 
§ 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3)." 446 U.S. at 697. As 
we are dealing here only with section 61-1-1(2) 
of the Utah provision, which is analogous to 
section 17(a)(2), we do not reach the question of 
a scienter requirement vel non under section 61-
1-1(1) or -1(3). 
"1" Even if Hochfelder were directly on point, the 
committee that promulgated the Uniform Securi-
ties Act has indicated that the Act, in most cases 
including this one, was not intended to bind state 
courts to related federal interpretations. See 
Uniform Securities Act § 501 cmt. 3 (1985), re-
printed in Blue Sky Laws 1993 428 (1993). In 
1985, the committee specifically indicated that it 
"did not intend that.state courts be bound to 
1360 UUl 865 PACIFIC EEPORTER, 2d SERIEF 
Further, even if we were to assume that 
rule lQb-5 and section 61-1-1(2) are direct 
parallels, as Larsen suggests, he fails to rec-
ognize that the Utah legislature has not re-
quired the courts to interpret the Utah Uni^  
form Securities Act in lockstep with federal 
decisions*. Section 61-1-27, on which Larsen 
relies for his lockstep mandater seems to 
make uniformity with other states ftiore im-
portant than uniformity with interpretations 
of analogous federal statutes- See Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-27. Section 61-1-27 pro-
vides that Utah's < Uniform Securities Act 
"may be so construed as to effectuate its 
general purpose to make uniform the law of 
those states which enact it and to coordinate-
the interpretation and administration of this 
chapter with the related federal legislation*".. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27 (emphasis add-i 
ed). Although the meaning of "coordinate" 
as it relates to federal legislation is not en-
tirely clear, the mandate "to make uniform"* 
the law of the enacting states is unmistak-
able. Uniformity with a significant majority 
of states is achieved only by a "no scienter" 
construction of the provision. See Johnson, 
213 Cal.App.3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr. at 369; 
People v. Whitlow, 89 IU.2d 322, 60 IH.Dec. 
587, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634, cert, denied, 459 
U.S. 830, 103 S.Ct 68, 74 L.Ed.2d 68 (1982); 
People v. Mitchell, 17S Mich.App. 83, 437 
N.W.2d 304, 307 (CtApp.1989), appeal de-
nied, 433 Mich, 895, 446 N.W.2d 830 (1990); 
State v. Fries, 214 Neb. 874, 337 N.W.2d 398, 
405 (1983); State v. Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715 
P.2d 471, 474 (CtApp.1986); State v. Cox, 17 
Wash.App. 896, 566 P.2d 935, 938 (1977), cert 
denied, 439 U.S. 823, 99 S.Ct 90, 58 L.Ed.2d 
115 (1978); Temby, 322 N.W.2d at 526. 
As a policy argument for his position, Lar-
sen argues that without a scienter require-
ment section 61-1-1(2) raises the specter of 
follow [Hochfelder] " Id To the extent that 
Larsen relies on a perceived mandate in the 
Uniform Securities Act favonng state adherence 
to federal interpretations his analysis is lacking 
in support 
8. Because a finding of scienter is not a prerequi-
site to criminal liability under section 61-1-1(2), 
the trial court properly refused to instruct the 
jury that good faith is a complete, defense to 
strict liability, or in other words, a fear that 
accounting firms and other professionals will 
be held liable for "good faith oversight" or 
failure "to discover and disclose a material 
fact" Larsen predicts that this threat of 
strict liability will preclude "responsible indi-
viduals and entities" from providing securi-
ties services in the future. This argument 
completely ignores the willfulness require-
ment of section 61-1-21, and misuses the 
term "strict liability." 
An individual must act willfully to be crimi-
nally liable under the statute. This means 
that the prosecution must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused "desire[d] 
to engage in the conduct or cause the result" 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103. This highly 
culpable mental state is not consistent with 
"strict liability," as that term is traditionally 
used. See Black's Law Dictionary 1422 (6th 
ed. 1990); 1 Wharton's Criminal Law § 23, 
123 (15th ed. 1993). Further, a "no scienter" 
reading of the statute will affect only those 
professionals who willfully omit or misstate^ 
material facts. This result seems to be ex-
actly what the legislature intended. If the 
legislature had wanted scienter for perceived 
public policy reasons, it could have included 
that requirement. It did not, and we will 
not* 
Larsen's second challenge is based on his 
claim that the trial court erred by allowing a 
securities expert for the State, Sherwood 
Cook,* to testify as to the "materiality" of 
information Larsen allegedly had omitted 
from securities-related documents. Larsen's 
argument before this court is somewhat dif-
fuse. Nevertheless, he appears to be assert-
ing that the trial court should not have ad-
mitted Cook's expert testimony on materiali-
ty under Utah Rule of Evidence 702 because 
the testimony purportedly expressed the "le-
cnminal liability Cf In re University Med Ctr, 
973 F 2d 1065, 1087-88 (3d Cir 1992), Barnett v 
United States, 594 F 2d 219, 222 (9th Cir 1979). 
j Look was introduced to the jury as a It inur 
Utah securities regulation official and the top 
secunues administrator in Nevada 
STATE v, 
Cite as 865 P.2d 
gal conclusion" that Larsen's omissions vio-
lated section 61-1-1(2), the statute prohibit-
ing material omissions or misstatements. 
[5,6] We first state the proper standard 
of review. The trial court has wide discre-
tion in determining the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony, and such decisions are re-
viewed under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard. State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 n. 1 
(Utah 1991); Dixon v. Steimrt, 658 P.2d 591, 
598 (Utah 1982); State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 
723, 726 (Utah 1982); see 2 Gregory P. Jo-
seph & Stephen A. Saltzburg, Evidence m 
America: The Federal Rules in the States 
ch. 51, § 51.3, at 2 & n. 4 (1987) [hereinafter 
Joseph and Saltzburg]; accord Wade v. 
Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 784 (8th Cir.1981), 
affd, 461 U.S. 30, 103 S.Ct 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 
632 (1983). Under this standard, we will not 
reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits 
of reasonability. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 
232, 239-40 (Utah 1992); Shurtleff v. Jay 
Tuft & Co, 622 P.2d 1168, 1173 (Utah 1980). 
[7] In general, the admissibility and lim-
its of expert testimony are governed by rules 
701 through 704 of the Utah Rules of Evi-
dence. Rule 702 provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto 
in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Utah R.Evid. 702. Under rule 702, the ques-
tion that must be posed prior to the admis-
sion of any expert evidence is whether, "on 
balance, the evidence will be helpful to the 
finder of fact." State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 
388, 398 n. 8 (Utah 1989); see Dixon, 658 
P.2d at 598. 
10. Cook did not, as Larsen suggests, testify that 
Larsen was guilty, nor did Cook testify that, as a 
matter of law, the facts satisfied the legal stan-
dard of materiality. 
11. Unlike Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 153 
(Utah 1987), the present case does not involve 
expert testimony regarding legal or factual issues 
not before the court or jury The Ashton roitrt 
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[8] In determining "helpfulness/' the tri-
al court must first decide whether the sub-
ject is within the knowledge or experience of 
the average individual. Dixon, 658 P.2d at 
597. It is not necessary that the subject of 
the testimony be so erudite or arcane that 
the jurors could not possibly understand it 
without the aid of expert testimony, nor is it 
a requirement that the subject be beyond the 
comprehension of each and every juror. See 
id 
[91 Here, we agree with the court of ap-
peals' statement that expert testimony may 
be appropriate in "securities fraud cases be-
cause the technical nature of securities is not 
within the knowledge of the average layman 
or a subject within the common experience 
and would help the jury understand the is-
sues before them." Larsen, 828 P.2d at 492-
93. In his testimony, Cook was expressing 
his opinion that some of the material that 
Larsen had omitted from the securities docu-
ments could have been important or signifi-
cant to an investor.10 We do not find that 
the trial court abused its discretion in deter-
mining that such testimony would be helpful 
to the jury.u 
[10] Larsen claims that even if the sub-
ject of this testimony might have been be-
yond the experience of the average individu-
al, Cook's testimony regarding materiality 
was not "helpful* because it transgressed 
into the area reserved for the jury by in-
structing the jury as to what legally consti-
tutes material information. Larsen focuses 
on Cook's occasional use of the term "materi-
al" during his expert testimony. Specifically, 
Larsen argues that Cook could have given 
his testimony without using the term "mate-
rial" and that by using the term, he moved 
from arguably admissible opinion evidence to 
aa "inadmissible legal conclusion" because 
upheld the trial court's exclusion of an attorney's 
proposed testimony on the legal effect of a joint 
tenant's transfer of property. Id. at 153. In 
other words, the proposed testimony in Ashton 
was intended solely to explain the applicable law, 
which did not aid the jury in resolving the factual 
disputes. 
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the statute m question is framed in terms of 
material information. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-1(2), 
In the present case, the use of the term 
"material" presents unique problems because 
it has two possible referents. First, in ordi-
nary parlance materiality means "important" 
or "significant" Oxford American Dictio-
nary 547 (1980). Used in this context, "ma-
terial" signifies something that an individual 
would want to know in making an important 
decision. One could testify about this con-
cept without using the term "material" by 
stating that the information allegedly omitted 
is important or significant Presumably, 
such testimony, assuming it was otherwise 
helpful and admissible, would not be objec-
tionable as expressing a legal conclusion. 
The second, and legal, usage of the term 
"material" comes from the Utah statute un-
der which Larsen was prosecuted and from 
securities law in general. The law uses the 
term "material" in defining what information 
must legally be disclosed. Larsen's basic 
claim is that when Cook used the disputed 
term, the trial court was allowing him to tell 
the jury that the omitted information legally 
constituted material information within the 
meaning of the statute, and Cook was there-
by instructing the jury that Larsen was 
guilty. Larsen suggests, in fact, that Cook's 
testimony would have been proper if he had 
used a word other than "material." 
Cook certainly should have avoided em-
ploying the specific term "material." Howev-
er, his limited use of that word, under the 
circumstances, does not mandate the conclu-
sion that he was improperly instructing the 
jury on the law. 
We think that Larsen's analysis, hanging 
as it does on one word that has two almost 
identical meanings, is unduly formalistic 
The jury was charged with making the ulti-
mate determination of whether the state-
ments made or facts omitted by Larsen were 
factually material, i.e.r whether they were 
likely to influence a reasonable investor., Cf. 
TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 
438, 450, 96 S.Ct 2126, 2132, 48 L.Ed.2d 757 
(1976) ("[IJssue of materiality may be charac-
terized as a mixed question of law and fact"). 
Given that "materiality" has a popular mean-
ing bearing directly on the factual issue be-
fore the jury and that Cook's testimony, 
when read in context, seems to use "materi-
al" as a synonym for "important," we do not 
believe that the trial court abused its discre-
tion by admitting Cook's testimony. 
111J Moreover, materiality, as it relates 
to the importance of the omitted information, 
was an "ultimate issue." Under Utah Rule 
of Evidence 704, expert testimony is not 
objectionable solely because it encompasses 
the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. 
Rule 704 provides in pertinent part that "tes-
timony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable be-
cause it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact" Utah R.Evid. 
704. Larsen's semantic characterization of 
Cooks testimony as a legal conclusion does 
not, without more, move the testimony out-
side the scope of this ultimate-issue rule. 
[12,13] Larsen correctly asserts that 
rule 704 does not make expert testimony 
admissible simply because it expresses an 
opinion regarding an ultimate issue. By the 
same token, however, rule 704 does not make 
expert testimony inadmissible simply be-
cause it expresses an opinion on the ultimate 
issue, as Larsen seems to suggest. See 
Span, 819 P.2d at 332 n. 1. As one commen-
tator noted, "Since the adoption of rule 704, 
courts have generally not hesitated to follow 
it and to permit expert testimony directly 
concerning the critical issue before the trier 
of fact" Joseph & Saltzburg, ch. 53, § 53.3, 
at 2; see People v. Rivers, 727 P.2d 394, 400 
(Colo.CtApp.1986) (holding that pathologist's 
opinion testimony indicating attack occurred 
in two stages is not improper because it 
embraced an ultimate issue); see also United 
States v. Cohen, 518 F.2d 727, 737 (2d Cir.) 
(holding that trial court did not abuse it 
discretion by admitting expert testimony on 
the reach of the concepts of "underwriter" 
and "materiality" in securities fraud case), 
cert denied, 423 U.S. 926, 96 S Ct 270f 271f 
46 L.Ed.2d 252 (1975) 
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The bottom line is that the question of . HALL, CJ., and STEWART, J., having 
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ieast on one level, a factual issue to be deter- District Judges, sat 
-mined by the jury. Rule 704 permits Cook 
'to express an opinion regarding the ultimate 
-resolution of that disputed issue as long as 
that testimony is otherwise admissible under YSV 
the rules of evidence. See Joseph & Salts- feKYSi^Sg{/ 
burg, ch. 53, § 53.3, at 3. Under the circum-
-atances, we are not persuaded that the trial 
-court abused its discretion in permitting 
Cook's testimony.12 
{14] Finally, even if the admission of 
Cook's testimony couched in terms of materi-
ality had been in error, Larsen has not con-
-vinced us that the error would .have been S. 
.harmful. The trial court correctly admon-
ished the jury as to the relative roles of 
-expert testimony and opinion evidence and 
instructed the jury to accord no unusual def-
erence to an expert's opinions. The trial 
court also gave careful instructions regarding g«] 
the legal definition and requirements of the 
*term "material" as used in the statute. Tak-
<fen together, these instructions substantially 
reduced whatever slight risk of confusion 
•Cook's use of the term "material" might have 
(engendered in the jury. Given the trial 
court's adequate instructions to the jury, we 
-find that if any error had occurred in admit-
.ting the expert testimony, it would have been 
harmless. 
The convictions are affirmed. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., DURHAM, J., and 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK and JOHN A. 
ROKICH, District Judges, concur. ac 
12. We do not suggest that the trial court must 1 
allow expert testimony regarding materiality, es- i 
pecially testimony utilizing the term "material." j 
We simply hold that the trial court did not abuse ] 




We also note that an integral element of a rule
 t 
702 determination to admit expert evidence is a
 t 
balancing of the probativeness of the evidence j 
against its potential for unfair prejudice. State v. , 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 n 8 (Utah 1989)
 t 
This balancing mimics that under rule 403 and is
 t 
necessary to a determination of "helpfulness." * 
In the present case, Larsen did not specifically 
object to the use of "material" on the ground ' 
.H., a minor, By and Through R.H., his 
father and guardian ad litem, R.H., indi-
vidually, and K.H., individually, Plain-
tiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
STATE of Utah, Granite School District, 
Utah State School for the Deaf and 
Blind, Utah State Board of Education, 
Yellow Cab Drivers Association, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, Clarence Froman, 
Barry E. Froman, and Charles L. Marsh, 
Jr., Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 920331. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec 23, 1993. 
Deaf Student and his parents brought 
tion against Btate. school district, state 
that the probative value of the usage was sub-
stantially outweighed by the potential for unfair 
prejudice or confusion of the issues. See Utah 
R.Evid 403. Larsen's objections, although cit-
ing to rule 702, addressed only the contention 
hat materiality in general was not a proper 
subject for expert testimony. Trial counsel must 
state clearly and specifically all grounds for ob-
jection. See Utah R.Evid 103(a)(1). Inasmuch 
as Larsen failed to assert a claim of prejudice at 
the trial court, that issue is not properly pre-
served for appeal. If Larsen had made such an 
objection, it might have merited serious consid-
eration by the trial court. 
